Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger


  • Hardcover
  • 544
  • Why We Lost
  • Daniel P. Bolger
  • en
  • 10 August 2020
  • 9780544370487

Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD

FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost READ & DOWNLOAD Why We Lost î PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD Where strategy was made and managed At the same time he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank and file soldiers in combat actions unusual for a general Now as a witness to all levels of military command Bolger offers a uniue assessment of these wars from 911 to the final withdrawal from the region Writing with hard won experience and unflinching honesty Bolge. Daniel Bolger s Why We Lost starts off as a bracing confessional I am a United States Army General and I lost the Global War on Terrorism It s like Alcoholics Anonymous Step one is admitting you have a problem Well I have a problem So do my peers And thanks to our problem now all of America has a problem To wit two lost campaigns and a war gone awry Bolger places the blame for why we lost not to any particular person or persons decision or event but at the feet of US generalship his peers Above tactical excellence yawned a howling waste Bolger laments Typically such criticism comes from lower ranking officers or in time from historians Bolger seems an unlikely source for such an assessment and I m pretty sure that he didn t secure an agreement on such a confession from all his general officer peersBolger served in Ira from 2005 to 2006 as the officer in charge of training the Irai army and then from 2009 to 2010 as commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division After that from 2011 to 2013 he led the US NATO mission training the Afghan army and police He holds a doctorate in history and has written several military histories He speaks his mind comparing himself to Gen Joseph Vinegar Joe Stilwell of World War II fame who was known for his coarse personalityWhy We Lost is neither a memoir nor a window into high level meetings and discussions It is largely a casual open source history US centric and well padded with heartfelt stories of erstwhile soldiers and Marines in firefights and other challenging circumstances It does not however clearly identify the key reasons why we lost or even establishes that we have indeed lost vice having shortfalls in meeting the original objectives Bolger s honesty is refreshing but his prose at times reads like an exercise in introspection and venting personal frustration something a psychologist would suggest a patient does to expunge demons In measured doses self flagellation cleanses and clarifies but placing all the blame on America s generals lets too many others off the hook There is always a risk that professional military advice to politicians becomes politicised or compromised to some degree particularly in the challenging circumstances involving insurgencies and nation building as we have seen in Ira and Afghanistan There is little doubt that both of these projects reuired much than just a military response Perhaps Bolger should have asked What is the US and its allies seeking to achieve in the Middle East and to what extent can the military contribute to that enterprise Of course that uestion is not for generals alone to answer It rightly belongs to elected and appointed officialsDespite his thesis regarding a failure of generalship writ large with a single exception he describes the three and four star officers who have run those wars as decent and well meaning perhaps damning them with the absence of terms like intelligent bold or courageous That exception is David Petraeus who Bolger clearly loathes Petraeus was all about Petraeus Bolger writes He was a charter member of the careerist self promotion society that hung out near the military throne rooms King David excelled at selling mostly himself but also for a time the Ira war Toward that end he assiduously cultivated journalists academics and members of Congress who spread his message like docile carrier pigeons Bolger s strategic case is that the US military should have gotten out of Afghanistan and Ira as uickly as possible after the combat operations phases and never started down the road of counter insurgency and nation building He believes that we lost largely because our generals never argued vigorously for this course of action Over time piece by piece the generals recommended slogging onward taking on two unlimited irregular conflicts I think in many respects this is exactly what did happen in Afghanistan with the draw down in 2002 and transition to NATO leadership and I m not convinced that this was a realistic course of action in Ira circa 2004 Why We Lost weighs significantly into the ongoing debate over how the US should wage war Bolger wrestles with defining the nature of the wars in Ira and Afghanistan In both cases from the external interveners perspective there seems to have been a distinct combat operations phase to remove two governments followed by a post combatcounter insurgencyreconstruction stabilisationnation building phase Within the second phase there have been insurgencies against the two new governments playing host to an semi imperial occupier as well as civil wars between different ethnic and religious groups within both countries Bolger recognises that this type of post combat counter insurgencyreconstruction stabilisationnation building actions are complex difficult and expensive and reuire a long term commitment in support of a legitimate host nation government Bolger believes that given the circumstances in Afghanistan and Ira the objectives for this second phase were preordained to failure from the outset He may be right but such a judgement is much easier in hindsightBolger argues that the US military is not designed or suited to post combatcounter insurgency reconstruction stabilisationnation building operations and should focus on short conventional combat operations against a clearly defined enemy force This is almost identical to the perspective in the US military after the war in South Vietnam and which saw the organisation eschew military operations other than real war for the better part of three decadesIn a couple of instances Bolger seems to espouse the view that we lost because not enough force was being applied largely in response to complaints of civilian casualties from the Karzai government Many of the average Pashtunsaccepted that in a war innocent people sometimes get killed Afghans would never love the International Security Assistance Force ISAF but they might well fear and respect the occupiers Here Bolger seems to revert disturbingly to a misplaced imperial or colonial mindsetBolger s language is sometimes too casual and his charges often unsubstantiated with evidence or examples As the book goes on the Vinegar Joe tone wears on the reader Red Cross workers are international do gooders On President Obama Bolger is unfair The thoughtful deliberate US president thoughtfully and deliberately condemned Americans in uniform to years of deadly pointless counterinsurgency patrols On former Afghan president Hamid Karzai he is simply offensive Karzai s writ ran to the outskirts of KabulAt least his obnoxious half brother Ahmed Wali Karzai was no having been assassinated Bolger also repeatedly refers to Clausewitz s friction and Sun Tzu s dictums in an effort to explain the nature of the wars but almost to the point of banalityIn the early stages of Why We Lost Bolger states that the so called Global War on Terror has gone awry but the book focuses almost exclusively on the campaigns in Afghanistan and Ira Other counter terrorism actions around the world are only peripherally mentioned While victory has remained elusive in those military centric actions there has been success in global coordination in the intelligence finance legal and policing ie non military realms against terrorismThe recent re intervention in Ira and the conclusion of the ISAF combat operations in Afghanistan has given rise to a lot of uestioning and soul searching Americans in particular are thinking afresh about the world and their place in it As US and coalition military forces including Australians once again go to war in Ira and stretch out their withdrawal from Afghanistan it is certainly worth thinking deeply about the nature of the wars we are participating in Bolger s book is an important one a testament to the frustrations and complexities of than a decade of war after 911 the end of which remains out of sight But as Bolger himself admits the young men and women who served at the sharp end will be far able to process the lessons of these wars than his own generation This book is worth reading and will hopefully help that generation begin this necessary and important process Amours fous unusual for a general Now as a witness to all levels of military command Bolger offers a Un amour fou à Montparnasse uniue assessment of these wars from 911 to the final withdrawal from the region Writing with hard won experience and L'Amour fou : 17 Passions extraordinaires unflinching honesty Bolge. Daniel Bolger s Why We Lost starts off as a bracing confessional I am a United States Army General and I lost the Global War on Terrorism It s like Alcoholics Anonymous Step one is admitting you have a problem Well I have a problem So do my peers And thanks to our problem now all of America has a problem To wit two lost campaigns and a war gone awry Bolger places the blame for why we lost not to any particular person or persons decision or event but at the feet of US generalship his peers Above tactical excellence yawned a howling waste Bolger laments Typically such criticism comes from lower ranking officers or in time from historians Bolger seems an J'ai choisi la folie : Car Dieu est amour fou unlikely source for such an assessment and I m pretty sure that he didn t secure an agreement on such a confession from all his general officer peersBolger served in Ira from 2005 to 2006 as the officer in charge of training the Irai army and then from 2009 to 2010 as commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division After that from 2011 to 2013 he led the US NATO mission training the Afghan army and police He holds a doctorate in history and has written several military histories He speaks his mind comparing himself to Gen Joseph Vinegar Joe Stilwell of World War II fame who was known for his coarse personalityWhy We Lost is neither a memoir nor a window into high level meetings and discussions It is largely a casual open source history US centric and well padded with heartfelt stories of erstwhile soldiers and Marines in firefights and other challenging circumstances It does not however clearly identify the key reasons why we lost or even establishes that we have indeed lost vice having shortfalls in meeting the original objectives Bolger s honesty is refreshing but his prose at times reads like an exercise in introspection and venting personal frustration something a psychologist would suggest a patient does to expunge demons In measured doses self flagellation cleanses and clarifies but placing all the blame on America s generals lets too many others off the hook There is always a risk that professional military advice to politicians becomes politicised or compromised to some degree particularly in the challenging circumstances involving insurgencies and nation building as we have seen in Ira and Afghanistan There is little doubt that both of these projects reuired much than just a military response Perhaps Bolger should have asked What is the US and its allies seeking to achieve in the Middle East and to what extent can the military contribute to that enterprise Of course that L'or des fous : Vies, amours et mésaventures au pays des Four Corners uestion is not for generals alone to answer It rightly belongs to elected and appointed officialsDespite his thesis regarding a failure of generalship writ large with a single exception he describes the three and four star officers who have run those wars as decent and well meaning perhaps damning them with the absence of terms like intelligent bold or courageous That exception is David Petraeus who Bolger clearly loathes Petraeus was all about Petraeus Bolger writes He was a charter member of the careerist self promotion society that hung out near the military throne rooms King David excelled at selling mostly himself but also for a time the Ira war Toward that end he assiduously cultivated journalists academics and members of Congress who spread his message like docile carrier pigeons Bolger s strategic case is that the US military should have gotten out of Afghanistan and Ira as Dieu est fou... d'amour pour toi uickly as possible after the combat operations phases and never started down the road of counter insurgency and nation building He believes that we lost largely because our generals never argued vigorously for this course of action Over time piece by piece the generals recommended slogging onward taking on two Aurélien (Les grands romans de l'amour fou) unlimited irregular conflicts I think in many respects this is exactly what did happen in Afghanistan with the draw down in 2002 and transition to NATO leadership and I m not convinced that this was a realistic course of action in Ira circa 2004 Why We Lost weighs significantly into the ongoing debate over how the US should wage war Bolger wrestles with defining the nature of the wars in Ira and Afghanistan In both cases from the external interveners perspective there seems to have been a distinct combat operations phase to remove two governments followed by a post combatcounter insurgencyreconstruction stabilisationnation building phase Within the second phase there have been insurgencies against the two new governments playing host to an semi imperial occupier as well as civil wars between different ethnic and religious groups within both countries Bolger recognises that this type of post combat counter insurgencyreconstruction stabilisationnation building actions are complex difficult and expensive and reuire a long term commitment in support of a legitimate host nation government Bolger believes that given the circumstances in Afghanistan and Ira the objectives for this second phase were preordained to failure from the outset He may be right but such a judgement is much easier in hindsightBolger argues that the US military is not designed or suited to post combatcounter insurgency reconstruction stabilisationnation building operations and should focus on short conventional combat operations against a clearly defined enemy force This is almost identical to the perspective in the US military after the war in South Vietnam and which saw the organisation eschew military operations other than real war for the better part of three decadesIn a couple of instances Bolger seems to espouse the view that we lost because not enough force was being applied largely in response to complaints of civilian casualties from the Karzai government Many of the average Pashtunsaccepted that in a war innocent people sometimes get killed Afghans would never love the International Security Assistance Force ISAF but they might well fear and respect the occupiers Here Bolger seems to revert disturbingly to a misplaced imperial or colonial mindsetBolger s language is sometimes too casual and his charges often Petit dictionnaire de l'amour fou unsubstantiated with evidence or examples As the book goes on the Vinegar Joe tone wears on the reader Red Cross workers are international do gooders On President Obama Bolger is Astrophil et Stella, L'Amoureux de l'Etoile et l'Etoile & Défense de la Poésie unfair The thoughtful deliberate US president thoughtfully and deliberately condemned Americans in L'Amour, fou uniform to years of deadly pointless counterinsurgency patrols On former Afghan president Hamid Karzai he is simply offensive Karzai s writ ran to the outskirts of KabulAt least his obnoxious half brother Ahmed Wali Karzai was no having been assassinated Bolger also repeatedly refers to Clausewitz s friction and Sun Tzu s dictums in an effort to explain the nature of the wars but almost to the point of banalityIn the early stages of Why We Lost Bolger states that the so called Global War on Terror has gone awry but the book focuses almost exclusively on the campaigns in Afghanistan and Ira Other counter terrorism actions around the world are only peripherally mentioned While victory has remained elusive in those military centric actions there has been success in global coordination in the intelligence finance legal and policing ie non military realms against terrorismThe recent re intervention in Ira and the conclusion of the ISAF combat operations in Afghanistan has given rise to a lot of FOUS D AMOUR uestioning and soul searching Americans in particular are thinking afresh about the world and their place in it As US and coalition military forces including Australians once again go to war in Ira and stretch out their withdrawal from Afghanistan it is certainly worth thinking deeply about the nature of the wars we are participating in Bolger s book is an important one a testament to the frustrations and complexities of than a decade of war after 911 the end of which remains out of sight But as Bolger himself admits the young men and women who served at the sharp end will be far able to process the lessons of these wars than his own generation This book is worth reading and will hopefully help that generation begin this necessary and important process

REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger

Why We Lost

FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost READ & DOWNLOAD Why We Lost î PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD A high ranking general’s gripping insider account of the US wars in Ira and Afghanistan and how it all went wrongOver a thirty five year career Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three star general commanding in both theaters of the US campaigns in Ira and Afghanistan He participated in meetings with top level military and civilian players. This is a candid heartfelt and perceptive a look at the US led campaigns 2001 2014 in Afghanistan and Ira It s not a spoiler to say that Gen Bolger spells out how the two campaigns came to muddled ends While his book doesn t have a fall of Saigon ending and this book published before the full emergence of the Islamic state it does mark the effective US departure from both wars at least this time The blame for this debacle he says is in the civilian leadership and generals and he counts himself among themHis narrative is a full on but terse military history of both conflicts post 911 and he includes background with the Soviet and British empires experience there His post 911 story is almost episodic a series of tactical incidents that demonstrate time and again that US and coalition forces fought well fought smart adapted in a neverending cycle of victory withdrawal to base return The men and women fought superbly he asserts and their efforts weren t the reason for the ultimate end He even demonstrates that coalition forces including Irai army and Sunni militias could be part of the successes and tells us much about the Awakening sahwa offensive by the latter in IraHe also tells of the personalities involved the minor US and local tactical leaders and of the generals Abizaid Casey Odierno among others not to mention the charismatic and puzzling David Petraeus Malik Daoud King David a TE Lawrence figure in Gen Bolger s telling complete with his own book Army Field Manual 3 24 Counterinsurgency It s a small but telling aside that Gen Bolger mentions other Army doctrinal writing the 1976 1982 and 1993 editions of FM 100 5 Operations which suggests both the Army s evolving tactics and also Gen Bolger s inside knowledge He also references other literature of the region Lawrence Kipling he uotes when you re lying wounded on the Afghanistan plain in Petraeus contextOne false note Gen Bolger s brusue dismissal of the Abu Ghraib affair and his bald assertion that the US military did not torture anyone there He could have said to back this up for one thing elsewhere in the book he mentions the Army s common use of staff field investigations under Army Regulation 15 6 to deal with incidents with civilians Maj Gen Antonio Taguba s 15 6 accusatory report on Abu Ghraib is public record but Gen Bolger doesn t touch on it He also says little about contractors both at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in these wars and their role does need examining Gen Bolger does talk in other chapters of civilians killed in encounters with US personnel candidly enough and his main point seems valid that even the best trained and disciplined personnel might go rogue if driven too hard for too longHis conclusions can be surprising that al aeda in Afghanistan was just about destroyed by the end of 2001 and that once invaded a 2003 pullout in Ira would have been disastrous enough Still he tells us that a stable democratic republic in Mesopotamia was too high flown a war objective and that pacification of Afghanistan a job the Soviet and British empires could not do was ultimately in vain as wellSo Gen Bolger s book still is worth a high recommendation He tells us why than how both campaigns ended in futility He does tell us just how much of the combatants courage training and suffering went into this and it s worth absorbing by readers and policy makers before the US attempts something like this again L'enfant qui devint fou d'amour/Pauvre laid ultimate end He even demonstrates that coalition forces including Irai army and Sunni militias could be part of the successes and tells Cassandre ou l'amour fou. us much about the Awakening sahwa offensive by the latter in IraHe also tells of the personalities involved the minor US and local tactical leaders and of the generals Abizaid Casey Odierno among others not to mention the charismatic and puzzling David Petraeus Malik Daoud King David a TE Lawrence figure in Gen Bolger s telling complete with his own book Army Field Manual 3 24 Counterinsurgency It s a small but telling aside that Gen Bolger mentions other Army doctrinal writing the 1976 1982 and 1993 editions of FM 100 5 Operations which suggests both the Army s evolving tactics and also Gen Bolger s inside knowledge He also references other literature of the region Lawrence Kipling he L'amour est fou uotes when you re lying wounded on the Afghanistan plain in Petraeus contextOne false note Gen Bolger s brusue dismissal of the Abu Ghraib affair and his bald assertion that the US military did not torture anyone there He could have said to back this Quarto, numéro 78 : Amours fous up for one thing elsewhere in the book he mentions the Army s common Amours fous use of staff field investigations Un amour fou à Montparnasse under Army Regulation 15 6 to deal with incidents with civilians Maj Gen Antonio Taguba s 15 6 accusatory report on Abu Ghraib is public record but Gen Bolger doesn t touch on it He also says little about contractors both at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in these wars and their role does need examining Gen Bolger does talk in other chapters of civilians killed in encounters with US personnel candidly enough and his main point seems valid that even the best trained and disciplined personnel might go rogue if driven too hard for too longHis conclusions can be surprising that al aeda in Afghanistan was just about destroyed by the end of 2001 and that once invaded a 2003 pullout in Ira would have been disastrous enough Still he tells L'Amour fou : 17 Passions extraordinaires us that a stable democratic republic in Mesopotamia was too high flown a war objective and that pacification of Afghanistan a job the Soviet and British empires could not do was J'ai choisi la folie : Car Dieu est amour fou ultimately in vain as wellSo Gen Bolger s book still is worth a high recommendation He tells L'or des fous : Vies, amours et mésaventures au pays des Four Corners us why than how both campaigns ended in futility He does tell Dieu est fou... d'amour pour toi us just how much of the combatants courage training and suffering went into this and it s worth absorbing by readers and policy makers before the US attempts something like this again

FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost

FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost READ & DOWNLOAD Why We Lost î PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD R makes the firm case that in Ira and in Afghanistan we lost but we didn’t have to Intelligence was garbled Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories And at the root of our failure we never really understood our enemy Why We Lost is a timely forceful and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective. An overview from the First Gulf War to the Second with Afghanistan to boot I found myself recognizing many of the names and the places especially those around the Fallujah and Ramadi areas circa 2006 2007 Recognition made this subject even interesting on my part The author discusses the pros and cons of the first Gulf War The fantastic redemption of American military arms after the loss of Vietnam A 100 hr campaign that ended in a successful termination of hostilities and images of the burnt out Irai column on the Highway of Death I still remember burnt out tanks and blown apart bunkers in Kuwait Or was it a victory Shiites who rose up again were slaughtered when we allowed the Irai Army the use of their helicopters They paid us back in Sadr City Also the Irai s were so kind to oblige us with the exposure of their divisions and fixed positions Our airpower made short work of the Irai army so thankfully exposed to our airstrikes and TLAM missile shots Later we invade Afghanistan with a perfect Blitzkrieg that would make Rommel proud Except this isn t what we want We did it but lost interest Al aeda was knocked out But we gained a new enemy the Taliban These Taliban were the same people we armed during their war with the Russians Ira became a new shiny object We were overzealous due to our uick victory and moved on We turned over Afghanistan to NATO and went off to Ira The knockouts continued Saddam s armies crumbled under the lightning strikes The Irai Air Force never even took off Baghdad was ours in a matter of weeks Yet again visions of the future emanated Fedayeen civilian irregulars put up of a fight than the regular Irai army Later we dismissed the Sunni Baathists and Army and the Shia filled the void The Sunni insurgency was born and Zarawi s AI became a menace The Golden Mosue was bombed and now we had a sectarian civil war Ira bogged us down while slowly the Taliban recovered Ira and Afghanistan became slugging insurgencies similar to Algeria Vietnam and other worse places How did we let ourselves get wrapped back up in guerrilla warsremember we swore we would not do that again Hubris We got cocky We thought we could pull it offmeaning the US fighting men and women could do it Just like they always do In this case we could not We had to leave and hope for the best ISIS Taliban Iran resurgent who knows where it will end up A good book for a long weekend Enjoy Quarto, numéro 78 : Amours fous understood our enemy Why We Lost is a timely forceful and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective. An overview from the First Gulf War to the Second with Afghanistan to boot I found myself recognizing many of the names and the places especially those around the Fallujah and Ramadi areas circa 2006 2007 Recognition made this subject even interesting on my part The author discusses the pros and cons of the first Gulf War The fantastic redemption of American military arms after the loss of Vietnam A 100 hr campaign that ended in a successful termination of hostilities and images of the burnt out Irai column on the Highway of Death I still remember burnt out tanks and blown apart bunkers in Kuwait Or was it a victory Shiites who rose Amours fous up again were slaughtered when we allowed the Irai Army the Un amour fou à Montparnasse use of their helicopters They paid L'Amour fou : 17 Passions extraordinaires us back in Sadr City Also the Irai s were so kind to oblige J'ai choisi la folie : Car Dieu est amour fou us with the exposure of their divisions and fixed positions Our airpower made short work of the Irai army so thankfully exposed to our airstrikes and TLAM missile shots Later we invade Afghanistan with a perfect Blitzkrieg that would make Rommel proud Except this isn t what we want We did it but lost interest Al aeda was knocked out But we gained a new enemy the Taliban These Taliban were the same people we armed during their war with the Russians Ira became a new shiny object We were overzealous due to our L'or des fous : Vies, amours et mésaventures au pays des Four Corners uick victory and moved on We turned over Afghanistan to NATO and went off to Ira The knockouts continued Saddam s armies crumbled Dieu est fou... d'amour pour toi under the lightning strikes The Irai Air Force never even took off Baghdad was ours in a matter of weeks Yet again visions of the future emanated Fedayeen civilian irregulars put Aurélien (Les grands romans de l'amour fou) up of a fight than the regular Irai army Later we dismissed the Sunni Baathists and Army and the Shia filled the void The Sunni insurgency was born and Zarawi s AI became a menace The Golden Mosue was bombed and now we had a sectarian civil war Ira bogged Petit dictionnaire de l'amour fou us down while slowly the Taliban recovered Ira and Afghanistan became slugging insurgencies similar to Algeria Vietnam and other worse places How did we let ourselves get wrapped back Astrophil et Stella, L'Amoureux de l'Etoile et l'Etoile & Défense de la Poésie up in guerrilla warsremember we swore we would not do that again Hubris We got cocky We thought we could pull it offmeaning the US fighting men and women could do it Just like they always do In this case we could not We had to leave and hope for the best ISIS Taliban Iran resurgent who knows where it will end L'Amour, fou up A good book for a long weekend Enjoy


10 thoughts on “Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger

  1. says: Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost This is a candid heartfelt and perceptive a look at the US led campaigns 2001 2014 in Afghanistan and Ira It's not a spoiler to say that Gen Bolger spells out how the two campaigns came to muddled ends While his book doesn't have a fall of Saigon ending and this book published before the full emergence of the Islamic state it does mark the ef

  2. says: FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD This book started out with the intriguing statement that the author a retired general lost the war on terrorism and his intent in writing the book is to explain the failures of America's military leadership though he does admit that political leadership does deserve some of the blame The books intent is supposedly then to

  3. says: Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger What an interesting book Having served a decade in the GWOT Global War on Terror both in Intelligence and Special Operations this was a great opportunity to see the war from a big picture Written by a 3 star General Lt General it is a combination of history and political science book though written as a history book Ful

  4. says: FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD

    Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Daniel P Bolger is a retired Army lieutenant general He has served for thirty five years in the US military with distinction having served in positions of command in both Ira and Afghanistan He is a history professor at West Point If anyone could articulate the reasons why we failed in Afghanistan and Ira it would most l

  5. says: REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD LTG Bolger's review of the wars in Ira and Afghanistan is disappointing The title is a bait and switch promising an examination of the strategic

  6. says: FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD

    FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD Daniel Bolger’s Why We Lost starts off as a bracing confessional “I am a United States Army General and I lost the Globa

  7. says: REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Best ExaminationExplanation of Ira and Afghanistan Conflicts to Date This book was reviewed as part of 's Vine program which included a free advance copy of the bookFor a decade the media has beaten the dead horses known as Enduring Freedom and Irai Freedom to influence public and political opinion nationally and globally

  8. says: FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger An overview from the First Gulf War to the Second with Afghanistan to boot I found myself recognizing many of t

  9. says: FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD

    REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Daniel P. Bolger Õ 6 READ & DOWNLOAD Great book Great book well written nicely done outline of wars in Ira and Afghanistan Hope we learned the lessons from these wars of counterinsurgency and avoid them in future

  10. says: Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger REVIEW ↠ PDF, eBook or Kindle ePUB Õ Daniel P. Bolger FREE DOWNLOAD Why We Lost

    Free Why We Lost Author Daniel P. Bolger Fun Read Ultimately Unsatisfying LTG Bolger successfully recounts over fifteen years of warfare against the back drop of the simple uestion of “who were we fighting” This uestion was used as a rhetorical tool as he skillfully moves the r

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *